#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:13
dsharshakovvoltages for all components are handled by SMC, so unless it bugs out we're safe#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:13
dsharshakovwhat're the examples? Maybe microLED XDR backlight (it has temperature sensors)#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:12
dsharshakovAh, okay, but the question remains#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:12
dsharshakovwould be fun if NOR can be debricked by DFU. then speakers are the only soft-breakable thing in the system which makes it fairly solid#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:11
dsharshakovbtw did he already get the m2 air back?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:09
dsharshakovsven: great idea to do before nuking a test machine#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:09
dsharshakovyeah, but to restore the machine AC2 needs to grab the ECID and somehow match it to the machine data#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:08
dsharshakovBefore enabling users to nuke the NOR somebody has to be sure to know how to restore that#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:06
dsharshakovECID is what, sorry?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:06
dsharshakovThere's a burned-in SN in the SoC itself so restore tool can just grab backups from the Apple online?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:04
dsharshakovWell, since nvram has more use cases, this makes more sense than working around to receive the bt pairing data from ADT. Also this way devices paired in Linux could be made working with macOS/recoveryOS#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:02
dsharshakovSo it'll be read from NOR, not using the ADT proxied data?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 19:00
dsharshakovwell, then it's likely to be considered public to the apps. Well, maybe there're some examples of passing sorta secret data from bootloader to Linux in other OF systems?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:58
dsharshakovjannau: how can non-root user read the DT info?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:57
dsharshakovamarioguy: got your msg. IIRC marcan had the same findings, that ID info loss will likely break DFU as well, so will likely need employees regenerating the data#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:56
dsharshakovBut how to do it (pass ADT pairing to bluetoothd) sanely? Reserved memory page created by m1n1, copy adt pairing data there and then expose the page as a virtual device from the kernel?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:54
dsharshakov"it would be readable by every user" might be the case if you simply place it there. But if it's an nvram device node, user cannot access it. `cat /dev/nvram` gives me permission error on my AMD machine#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:53
dsharshakov"do you mind hopping in asahi-re" - no problem, write there, I might just read from logs if I have no questions#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:52
dsharshakov"in the nvram proxy data in the ADT" seems someone needs to expose the adt node as a efuse-like node in OF DT and then as a nvram device to userspace so that bluez can get it either directly or using our initramfs scripts#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:51
dsharshakovamarioguy: what it is? Is there a map or description of what is in the NOR?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 18:50
dsharshakovamarioguy: well, that was not a surprise. I just supposed sep could be involved in storing the pairing keys as they're sorta secure material. however, not to that extent#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:56
dsharshakovspeakers are one of those, and nvram might be so as well (needs testing). Anything else seems to be unbreakable thanks to SMC and other hardware handlers of critical things#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:55
dsharshakovwell, can someone imagine other part of the system you could damage with software not being able to DFU-restore afterwards?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:53
dsharshakovEssentially the two things possibly permanently breakable from software thus requiring extra safety when playing around#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:52
dsharshakovthen someone will have to verify that before shipping with nvram enabled...#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:50
dsharshakovsven: they keep a backup of sn-paired data like wireless calibration?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:48
dsharshakovhowever that's not SO sensitive to live in SEP, that makes sense#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:47
dsharshakovHave anyone RE'd SEP enough or just thoughts?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:47
dsharshakovWhat else? Maybe bt pairing data as well, but most likely SEP holds that#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:46
dsharshakovSo far it's boot picker (replaceable by just holding option while booting), updates (how to download those, maybe that's better done by the second macOS install or rebooting into stub)#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:45
dsharshakovWell, that's another risk area like speakers are. Maybe it doesn't worth it unless tested and consideres carefully#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:43
dsharshakovI remember reading some writeup telling that NOR contains ID and calibration, so unless you have a backup you need to send it to Apple to repair (maybe Apple Store employees can restore as well, but certainly needs some tech)#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:42
dsharshakovthe boot selection or what precisely?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:38
dsharshakovit shouldn't be needed for us anyway since all useful data is extracted and filled into the ADT aiui#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 07:37
dsharshakovChaosPrincess: iirc it's only repairable by Apple (or you if you have backed it up). However, the SPI controller node it's attached to is blocked in DT, so you cannot destroy the flash accidentally#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:54
dsharshakovYes, marcan's idea is very nice, kernel has no problem finding idle streams. However, I want to better know how would you trust a process? Probably it just has to be root, know the handshake and boost volume only after opening the VISENSE pcm#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:32
dsharshakovI mean running another instance as a child process#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:32
dsharshakovDoing own daemon-in-daemon supervision can help a bit, but that seems to be hackier than a ping ioctl.#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:31
dsharshakovSIGKILL cannot be handled rly. Well, then in typical scenario systemd restarts the thing. But there're edge cases...#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:14
dsharshakovWell, users need to kill it with segkill to avoid proper shutdown, Yes?#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:14
dsharshakovI see the point#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:13
dsharshakovYes, oomd and early earlyoom send terminate, but what about kernel#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:13
dsharshakovIdk if kernel oom killer will warn before killing#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:12
dsharshakovAnd if it ooms oom service likely will send a sigterm first#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:12
dsharshakovYes#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:11
dsharshakovWell, not insisting. The overall approach seems quite nice engineered, looking forward to seeing some info about it working#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:10
dsharshakovThe ping is not overengineering imo. This way to destroy the speakers user has to know how to call ping ioctls, that unlikely coexist with stupid actions#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:08
dsharshakovWell, if it's not pinging kernel enters safe mode then#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:07
dsharshakovAnd some issues which lead to us getting garbled buffers might exist really if some bug happens in the kernel driver#asahi-dev · 2022-12-02 05:06
dsharshakov* daemon receiving a signal from layer8 which truly believes you tossed some malware to them. How could speakersafetyd be useful for my computer hmmm